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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION 
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT OF 
DIRECTIVE 91/440/EEC ON THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE COMMUNITYS RAILWAYS 
AND ON ACCESS RIGHTS  FOR RAIL FREIGHT SUMMARY 
.  1.  Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community's railways is  the most iJl!portant 
Community measure to improve the competitiveness of rail transport. Its main aims are to create 
railways independent of the State and managed on commercial iines and to begin the integration 
of the market for rail transport services. There have been calls for  th~ Cqmmission to  report ori  · 
the implementation and  impact of the Directive to  help discussion of further measures, and for 
that reason it presents this communication. 
2.  The first obligation of the  Directive is  to  grant railways  a st_atus  independent of the State and . 
management  independence.  The  report  finds  the  provisions  of  the  Directive  have  been 
implemented  and  considerable  progress  made  in  increasing  the  autonomy  of  railway 
management. However, while there are legitimate reasons for the public authorities to intervene 
in  certain areas,  they still  restrict  independence  to  an  unjustified  extent.  Until their informal 
practices change, the aim of real autonomy will  not be achieved.  There are,  neverthel'es~, wide. 
differences between Member States in relations between the authorities and the railways. 
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3.  Seeond,  the  Directive  requires  Member  States  at  least  to  separate  the  accounts  of transport 
services and  infrastructure management, although they can go further and separate into distinct 
·  ~egal  erititi~s. The aim is to further efficient operation of two different activities, to make the use 
of aid transparent, to create a basis for infrastructure c4arges, and to  ensure fair treatment of all · 
railway undertakings when it comes to the utilisation of infrastructure. The communication finds 
the situation unsatisfactory in  the case of the railways· that remain  integrated enterprises, with 
transport services and infrastructure management provided by the same entity. In the first place,  -
it seems  th~t only profit and  loss  accounts  are separated and  not balance sheets;  this  does not 
aHow the degree of financial  transparency-required.· In  the second,  il).tegrated  railways are still. 
responsible .  for  functions  that  can  determine  the  entry  of competitors  into  the  market;  this 
situation crinstitutes an abuse of dominant position.  ' 
4.  Third,  the  Directive obliges  Member  States  to  reduce  railway. debt to  a  level  that  does  not 
. impede sound financial management and to improve railway finances.  The communication finds 
that railway finances  came under increasing pressure in  the  1980's. Although Member States 
injected  equity on a ·large scale,  debt  increased  iri  absolute  terms,  leading to  higher interest 
payments and hence operating costs. The. situation varied greatly, however, from one railway to 
'another.  In the early  1990's many  States  began to  restructure railway finances,  often under a 
major reform  of the sector.  However,  while balance sheets  were strengthened,  the burden of 
interest payments increased. The differences between Member States were again considerabl.e. In 
1995,  the railways  in  five  States  faced  serious debt problems,  but since then four  States have 
restructured railways finances, although the results do not yet show up in-the available statistics. 
The Commission intends to report on railway debt again in three years time.  ' 5.  The  fourth  requirement  of  the  Directive  is  to  establish  certain  access  rights  to  railway 
infrastructure for railway undertakings established in  the Community. The communication finds 
that very few railway undertakings have exploited these rights,  including in  the Member States 
that implemented them several years ago.  On the one hand this is  because of high start-up costs 
and  strong competition.  On  the other,  the Community  has  not completed  the  framework  for 
access; the Commission intends rapidly to propose guidelines for infrastructure charges and for 
capacity allocation, which should fi II  the main gaps. In addition it is  necessary to ensure that all 
railways are treated fairly  when seeking access.  If integrated railways  retain  responsibility for 
activities  like  setting  charges,  allocating  train  paths,  licensing  and  safety  certification,  they 
determine the conditions under which their competitors enter the market and do business.  The 
Commission intends to make proposals to remove such conflicts of interest. 
6.  Besides, with the exception of combined transport, the access rights of the Directive are limited, 
particularly by the obligation to find a partner undertaking in another Member State to form an 
international grouping,  when  in  practice the only  partner is  usually  the national  railway.  The 
communication discusses how best to continue the opening of the market, but in  a progressive 
way that avoids  disruption  in  the  spirit of the Commission's  Communication on services  of 
general  interest in  Europe (1996).  Thus,  the Commission is  of the opinion that further market 
opening should be taken  in  steps and  concentrate on the rail  freight sector.  As  a first step,  it  · 
would not disrupt the main business of the incumbent railways, if the Community were to open 
5% of the freight market in  each Member State  immediately and to  continue liberalisation by 
stages to reach 25% after ten years. 
7.  Employment in  the railway  sector has  been  in  serious secular decline since the  1980s.  It is 
difficult to  attribute this directly to the Directive,  not only because of the different causes ·but 
also because many Member States have only implemented it  recently and little real competition 
has yet emerged for the incumbent railway undertakings. Nevertheless, the future of the industry 
and  its  ability  to  meet  the  challenges  of adapting  to  the  new  conditions  will  depend  on  its 
modernisation but also on  maintaining the employability and adaptability of the workforce. The 
Commission will continue to monitor employment trends in this critical sector. t· INTRODUCTION 
I. Directive 91/440fEEC
1  is  the  principal  measure  that  the  Community  has  taken  to  raise  the 
· competitiveness of rail transport. It is a first step in establishing 'railways independent of the state 
and managed on commercal lines and in  creating an  integrated and competitive market for rail 
·  transport services. Various Member States and interested parties have called on the Commission 
to_ report on the implementation and  impact of the Directive in order to advance .discussion of 
further .measures, including those proposed  in  the  Commission's white paper "A strategy for 
.revitalising·the Community's railways"
2  of 1996.  · 
2.  Among other thirigs, Directive 91/440/EEC obliges Member States to help reduce the railways' 
.  .  I 
debt$  and  improve their finances;  in  its  white  paper,  the Commission undertook to report on , 
'progress  m~de. It then  decided  to  integrate  the  report  in· this  general  communication on the 
implementation and impact of the Directive, in order to give an overall view ·of  the situation. 
3.  The Directive covers four areas of policy: 
\  -
,..the management independence of railway undertakings. (Articles 4 and 5) 
. -:the· separation of infrastructure· management and transport operations, at least in the accounts. 
(Article 6) . :  ·  ·  ·  · 
-the reduction of  debt and improvement of finances. (Article 9) 
-access rights to railway infrastructure. (Article 1  0) 
.  This  communication  deal$  with  each  area,  and  also  with .  the  effects of the  Directive_ ori 
employment because of concern about the continuing fall  in railway employment. The Directive . 
leav~s the Member States considerable scope for  implementing measures in ways that fit their 
_  Circumstances, .so a  central theme of this report is the differences between the s.olutions chosen 
.  ·  6y··fhe .M:elribei-::sia:ies .. · ·  ·  · · 
1 CouncilDirective of 29 July 1991 on the de~elopmcnt  of the Gommunitis railways (91/440/EEC). O.J. No. L237, 
24.8.91.  ' 
2 COM (96) 421  final, 30.7.1996. 4.  The  Commission  has  based  the  communication  on  two  independent  studies
3  and  on  other 
material available on the implementation of the directive, but has  come up  against certain limits 
to  the exercise.  First,  various  Member  States  have  combined  implementation of the directive 
with ageneral reform of the rail sector. This means that it is difficult to disentangle the effects of 
the directive from those of other policies. Second, the time period is short. Member States were 
supposed to have transposed the Directive by 1st January 1993 but most were late in doing so, so 
shortening the period for judging results.  Nevertheless the Commission has  found it possible to 
draw valid conclusions for policy, which are presented at the end ofthis communication. 
II. MANAGEMENT INDEPENDENCE 
5.  The Directive obliges Member States to  give the railways independent status from  the State, to 
allow them to work according to  commercial principles adjusting their activities to the market, 
and to make them  responsible for their business  plans  (Articles  4  and  5).  All  Member States 
have transposed the relevant articles of the directive by either setting up  independent entities or, 
when they existed, by increasing their autonomy and transforming them into enterprises. In most 
Member States  transport services  are now  run  by  publicly  owned  joint-stock  companies,  in 
France,  Ireland  and  Spain  by  state  enterprises  with  commercial  status  and  in  the  United 
Kingdom  by privately-owned companies.  In  the  1990's there  has  been a  clear move towards 
enterprises with independence and responsibility for their commercial future. 
6.  The situation is  more complex on the side of infrastructure management.  Some Member States 
have maintained  integrated  companies,  including  both  transport  operations  and  infrastructure 
management;  a  majority  has  gone  further,  some  creating  separate  entities  which  are  usually 
public agencies or enterprises with limited commercial freedom and subject to close guidance ~y 
the state;  and  at  least  one  presently  integrated  company  will  evolve  in  this  direction.  These 
organisations may have regulatory functions as well as that of managing assets. This implies that 
greater  public  intervention  may  be  justified  in  infrastructure  management  than  in  transport 
operations and that Directive 91 /440/EEC may need modification to reflect that difference. 
7.  While the Directive lays  down rules on  management independence,  there remain wholly-valid 
reasons  for  the  public authorities  to  intervene  in  rail  transport,  which  Community  legislation 
allows.  The first is to ensure the provision of public services that transport operators would not 
supply if looking only to their commercial interests. All Member States require public services, 
for example to reduce pollution and congestion caused by private cars, or to help disadvantaged 
social groups. Community legislation allows Member States to  impose public service obligations 
on railway undertakings, as  well to contractualise services, so  long as they compensate correctly 
for the financial burden involved. 
3 
Prognos : Examination of the implementation and impact of Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the 
Community's Railways. Study for the European Commission (DGVII) and the International Union of Railways 
(IUC); March 1998.  · 
Mercer Management Consulting : Public contributions to  Railway Finances 1996; Update and Supplement 1997. 
Prepared for DGVli, European Commission. 8.  Although Member"States are free to  provide the services they consider in  the.public interest, the· 
means  by .  which  they.  obtain  these  services  can  make  a  great  difference  to  management 
-independence. There is ·a difference between imposing public service 'obligations and negotiating 
contracts  between  the  public  authorities  and  the  t~ansport operator.  Al~hough  ·  ma~y Member 
States ·now have contracts of some kind with railway undertakings, present rules do not require 
. the  use  of contracts  and  are  not  sufficiently  precise  clearly  to  define  the  obligations  and· 
compensation to be  negotiated.  The Commission  intends  to  propose  in  1998  the  revision of 
_ .Community rule_s on public services in land transport, to. generalise the use of contracts, to define 
better their:content and to ensure that they are awarded faidy. 
'•. 
9.  The second reason for _public  intervention is  to  develop railway infrastructure; indeed this  is  a· 
requirement of Directive-91/440fEEC (ArtiCle 7).  However, governments have often promoted 
infrastructure  investments,  for  reasons  of overall  transport  policy,  which  have been the main; 
cause of the debt that  railways  accumulated until  the  1990's.  ServiCing  this debt reduces the 
resources available to  management and limits its  real  autonomy.  Since the early  1990's~ many 
Member States have restructured finances, relieving the railways of debt and of debt service and 
taking over responsibility Jor financing infrastructure.  This  may lift the financial burde_n  from 
. operators  of  transport  services,  but.  may  not  change · State  influence  on  infrastructure 
management. 
10.While  these  are  legitimate  forms  of  intervention,  States  still  tend  to  limit  managerial 
independence to a:n  unjustified extent. For instance, they rriay  heavily restrict a railway's area of .. 
·commercial'· freedom,  by  treating all  passenger transport as  a  public service and so subject to.  · 
obligation or contract;  or they may  regulate all  passenger fares,  as  several.Member States. do . 
. They may .also. control· investment decisions, and. management appointments below the top layer 
and influence procurement decision~, none of. which they need to  do to protect their interests as 
shareholders. Conditions of employment are often more tightly regulated than in other sectors. 
.  ' 
11.It follows  that management· independence is  not just a  matter of formal  rules  ~d  structures, 
important as they are, but also of the informal practices .of public authorfties. Until ·this changes, 
the objective, of manage_ment  autonomy  will.  not be  achieved.  The  situation  varies. greatly 
between  Member  States;  some  allow  real  autonomy,  others,  while  meeting  the  formal  · 
requirements of the di-rectives,  closely supervise their railways  .. The independent- study on the 
implementation of  the Directive gives this classification:  · 
:-the highest degree of management independence is  probably found in Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, followed by Austria, Germany and the Netherlands.  ·  · 
-less  autonomy is  granted  in  Belgium,  France,'· Luxembc;mrg  and  Spain,, where  governments 
contrortong term aims and approve key decisions .. 
-railways appear to  have least  independence in  Denmark,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Portugal, · 
where governments intervene continually at different levels and in different ways.  · 
'  .  :  ' 
.·  The recent reforms in  several  Member States may well  increase autonomy but it is too soon to 
assess their effects.  ·  -HI. SEPARATION  BETWEEN  INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGMENT AND TRANSPORT 
SERVICES 
12.The  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  separate  the  accounts  of transport services  and  of 
infrastructure management (Article 6).  They can  go further and create distinct divisions within 
an  undertaking or separate  entities  altogether.  Separation  of accounts  was  intended _to  serve 
several purposes. One was to  promote the efficient development and operation of two activities 
that were linked but different, particularly so  far  as  commercial orientation and public purpose 
were concerned. Another was financial,  to  make aid more transparent, to  clarify use of public 
funds, and to provide a basis for-infrastructure charges that were fair and non-discriminatory. 
13 .While all Member States have taken certain measures to separate accounts, a majority have gone 
further and separated the two activities. This was to help achieve greater financial transparency 
at  a  time  of growing  pressure on  public expenditure,  adapt  organisational  structures  to two 
different activities  and  deal  with  special  situations  in  Member  States  like  Germany  and  the 
United  Kingdom.  Other  have  maintained  integrated  railways  because  they  considered  this 
important for  technical and safety reasons or to maintain national services and institutions. 
14.To  simplify,  three· different  approaches  have  emerged.  First,  complete  separation  into  two 
distinct  legal  entities.  This was  first  done  by  Sweden  and  the United  Kingdom,  followed  by 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Portugal,  and  the  Netherlands.  The  United  Kingdom  conceded 
infrastructure  management  to  a  privatised  company,  while  the  other  States  created  public 
agencies.  In  the  Netherlands,  companies  are  responsible  for  infrastructure  maintenance  and 
development,  capacity  allocation  and  traffic  control,  which  work  more  like  public  agencies. 
France and Finland have organised things in  a different way, creating separate public bodies for 
financing and developing infrastructure, while conceding or contracting the actual management 
to the national. railway undertaking or a related enterprise. 
1  S.Thesecond approach was to maintain an  integrated enterprise but to form distinct business units 
within it,  each  with  some autonomy  and  certain  financial  responsibilities.  Austria,  Germany, 
ltal}l  and Spain restructured their national  ra:ilway  companies into  business units several years 
ago,  while  Belgium  has  done  so  recently.  Typically  this  went  beyond  a  division  into 
infrastructure management and  transport operations,  to  a separation between freight,  long and 
short distance passenger services,  infrastructure, stations,  real  estate  anc~ so on.  However there 
are great differences between these structures.  Business units  are organised in different ways, 
from divisions responsible for the whole process of planning, producing and marketing services, 
with their own personnel and  assets,  to  units responsible for planning and market services but 
"buying'' most of their inputs from  other units and so  having little control over production and 
costs. Their real autonomy varies greatly and will change over time; several states, like Germany 
and Italy intend to go further in separation. 
16.The third  option  was  to  maintain  a fully  integrated  railway  with  separate accounts.  This was 
taken  by  Greece,  Ireland  and  Luxembourg,  which  !"!ave  much  smaller  railway  networks  than 
other Member States, though important flows of traffic pass through Luxembourg in transit. '· 
17.Except for the railways that have been divided into separate entities, the separation of accounts 
has proved unsatisfactory. The accounts of an enterprise have several parts, and include at least a 
· profit and  loss account and a balance sheet; an  enterprise has  to  present and have both audited. 
According  to  the  Commission's  study;  although  all  Member. Statei  have. transposed  this 
requirement of the Directive,  no  integrated railw.ay  has  prepared or published separate balance 
sheets. Moreover it appears that only the railways of Austria, Germany, Ireland :and Spain:have' 
prepared  profit  and  loss  accounts,  which  RENFE  (Spairt)  alone  has  published:  In. Belgium, 
Denmark,  G~eece, Itaiy, Luxembourg and Portugal either separate accounts are not yet~eady or 
. no. solid  information is  available _on  the situation.  It should be recalled that the separation of 
·accounts  is  the minimum  degree of separation  possible and  that several Member States have 
. managed to ·achieve  compl~te separation of transport services  and  infrastruyture management,. 
since the implementation of  the Directive.  · 
IS .The  separation  of accounts  is  very  important,. since  a  clear  and  full  financial  statement  is 
essential for effective management of both transport· operations and infrastructure management; 
although  linked,. they  produce  diff~rent  servi~es and -differ  in  the  extent  to  which  they  are 
. commercially orientated _or  serve public purposes.  It is  also  necessary to  make transparent the 
use to _which  public support is  put, as  Member States provide public money to  compensate for 
public services, balance exceptional ·soCial  costs, support infrastructure,. provide equity and fu"'d · 
operating deficits.  Another reason -for  separating  accounts  is  to  create· a  solid  foundatio~ for 
infr~structure  charges . through  clear  identification . of  cost  and  of present  revenues  from 
infrastructure._ Consequently,  the  Commission  intends  fully  to  clarify  the  legal  situation,  by 
amending Directive 91/440/EEC to require the preparation and. publication of  separate profit and 
loss accourit and balance sheets for transport service and infrasfructure management. 
IV.DEBT REDUCTION AND FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT 
19.The unsound state of railway finances became increasingly clear throughout the 1980's as _debt 
ros_e  and  debt  servicing  became  a burden  on. finances.  If the  rail~ays were "to  be managed\ 
independently, operate in  a· commercial manner and face up to competition, their finances had to 
be put on a sou,nd basis. The Directive therefore required Member States to help reduce qebt to a 
level that did· not· impede sound financial  management and to  improve the financial situation of 
the railways.  In  its  White Paper, "A strategy for  revitalising the Community's railways";  the 
Commission  undertook  to  report  regulafly  on  progress  in  reducing  debt  and. in  improving 
finances. This section deals with debt and debt service and the measures taken by Member States 
to tackle the debt problem, which was the focus of  Article 9 Qf Directive 91/440/EEC. Of course 
railway finance has many other aspects? and governments support the railways in different ways. ' 
. Trends in the 1980's 
' 
20.Railway_ finances  were  under  pressure  in  the  1980's  for ·several  reasons.·  Railways  invested 
heavily  in  new assets  in  an  attempt to  make their  product more attractive and •  stem  losses  in 
traffic. Revenue fell  considerably, primarily because of a  sl~mp in  freight revenue and yields. 
Althot1;gh  they cut costs;  the reductions  did  not balance the fall· in  revenue,  so  that operating 
losses continued to  be heavy.  Reductions in  government support of railways  in  many countries 
.led to  unfu~-ded losses, which put further pressure on accounts.  ·  ·  ' 21.There was  a striking increase in  capital  employed and  hence  in  asset intensity.
4  This resulted 
principally from  infrastructure investment,  especially  in  high~speed lines,  from  investment  in 
new  rolling stock,  largely  for  high-speed  and  long  distance  passenger services,  and  from  the 
automation of various processes. Over the decade total capital employed by Community railways 
increased  in  real  terms from  ECU  142 billion to  ECU  189  billion, a rise of 33%; while asset 
intensity grew from  1.9 to 2.9. 
22.It is  sometimes thought that the  increase  in  investment  in  the  1980's  was  funded  primarily 
through debt.  In fact the main source of capital was government contributions, which appeared 
on balance sheets as  eq!]ity.  Consequently,  although total  liabilities  and both equity and debt 
increased significantly in  absolute terms,  the  proportion of total  liabilities represented by debt 
decreased considerably. While from  198Q  to  1990 total capital employed rose to 189 billion, as 
said, debt increased from  97 to  108  billion (+11%) and  equity from 45  to  81  billion (+80%). 
This meant a considerable decline in  the ratio of debt to  equity,  from  2.15  in  1980 to  1.34 in 
1990
5 
. (See table I for information on each railway). 
23.Higher levels of debt in  absolute terms,  nevertheless,  led to  increased interest payments; these 
• added· to operating costs and absorbed a greater proportion of income, even when interest rates 
were  related  to  government- stock  rather  than  at  full  commercial  level.  On  average  interest 
payments increased as  a proportion of operating costs from. 7% in  1980 to  11% in  I990,  and 
were  well  above· that  level  in  the  case  of  thre~  railways.  This  represented  a  serious  and 
unsustainable burden on enterprises that were already in financial difficulties for other reasons. 
24. These  general  trends  concealed  large  differences  in  financial  performance.  Certain  railways 
maintained  historically  low  ratios  of debt  to  equity  and  of debt  service  to  operating  costs 
throughout the  period,  in  particular  DSB  (Denmark),  VR (Finland),  OBB  (Austria)  and  NS 
(Netherlands). The fact that the State took  much  responsibility for  investment in  the network 
contributed to this.  In  contrast debt : equity ratios were high and  increased in the case of CIE 
(Ireland),  CP  (Portugal),  DB  (Germany),  RENFE  (Spain)  and  to  the  greatest  extent  SNCF 
(France).  Debt service was  a  particular burden  on  the  finances  of CP,  FS, · RENFE and  the 
SNCF.  The ·debt  : equity  ratios  of BR (Great Britian),  FS  (Italy)  and  SNCB  (Belgium)  fell 
markedly, while those of CH (Greece) and SJ/BV (Sweden) rose substantially from a low level. 
Trends since I990 
25.In the early 1990's governmentsstarted to  restructure railway finances, often as part of a major 
reform of the sector.  Significant improvements were made in the ratio of debt to  equity on the 
balance sheet, but the burden of debt service on costs and income continued to grow. Between 
1990 and 1995, total capital employed increased from ECU I89 billion to 199 billion (+5%), but 
debt fell  from  108  to  10I  billion (-6%) (after reaching  130 billion in  I993), while equity was 
raised  from  81  to  97  billion  (+20%).  Overall,  the  debt  : equity ratio  fell  from  1.34  to  1.04, 
around unity, and debt service decreased slightly relative to  operating costs, from  11% in  1990 
to  I 0% in  1995 because of financial  restructuring in  Germany.  (See table 2 for information on 
each railway). Since 1995, the last year for which statistics were available, several governments 
have reorganised railway finances, so further improvements in the debt situation should show up 
in later figures. 
4 Asset intensity is the number of units of capital required to support one unit of operating costs. 
5 The debt : equity ratio is that between debt (both short and long term) and equity. Equity is expressed as 1, so a debt 
equity ratio above 1 shows that there is more debt than equity in the balance sheet. _ 26.Again, the differences in  performance we·re great. The reduction in  debt between 1990 and 1995 
· was  largely· the  result  of action  in  three  countries,  Germany,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands.  In 
Germany; the government wrote down  assets  and  transfe'red debt to  the Federal R."ailway  Fund 
(Bundeseisenbahn~ermogenY as  part of general  reorganisation  of the sector; transforming the 
accouf}tS.  The merger of DB  and DR (Deutsche Reichsbahn) makes comparison difficult but in _ 
-·- 1994 the new DB  AG emerged with a healthy balance sheet that showed a debt : equity ratio of 
. 0.53, while debt service fell to an  insignificant level.  In Italy, the financial restructuring of  FS in 
1994 had a major impact on the level of debt and of debt service. FS' debt has been transfered to 
the State, which is  paying the interest and  is  eventually to  repay the debt itself.  After growing 
from. ECU 31  billion in  1990to ECU 42 billion ih  1994, debt fell to 30 billion in 1995; and there 
was a sharp ·fall  in  the debt:  equity ratio from  1.1  in  1990 and  1.04  in  1994, to 0.69 in  1995. 
Oebt serVice payments, however, increased from  21% of operating costs in  1990 to no less than' 
. 29%  in  ._  1995  but are  expected  to  fall  sharply  under  the  debt  reduction  programme.  In  the 
Netherlands,  the  State  has  funded  a  large  proportion  of capital  requirements  through  equity . 
injections and,  as. part of a general organisation, removed. infrastructure from  NS' balance sheet 
to take direct responsibility. The debt equity : ratio fell from 0.58 in  1990 to 0.42 in 1995, while 
capital employed was reduced by about one half 
27.In  some .other  Member  States,  railway  debt'  increased  heavily  between  1990  and  1995, 
particularly  in  Greece,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  France.  In  Greece,  CH'  s debt jumped by 
125%, and the debt : equity ratio rose from  0.58 to  0.93, near to the Community average. Debt 
service grew from  9 to  15% of operating costs.  These trends  are mainly the consequence of  a 
large, unfunded operating deficit(?  I% of operating costs in  1995). The financial situation of CP 
(Portugal) deteriorated more than of  any other railway, from an already difficult position, largely 
because of a growing unfunded operating deficit.  Since  1990,  accumulated losses  have almost ·. 
eliminated equity, resulting in a debt: equity ratio of 1-2.86 in  1995; over the period debt service 
virtually doubled as a proportion of operating costs, from  16% in  1990 to 30% in-1995. RENFE 
(Spain) has had .a high level of debt for years, much incurred in the 1970's and  1980's, although 
it has 'not  increased greatly over the  last decade,  the  government having injected  equity· on  a 
substantial scale. The debt : equity ratio is  now high  but fairly stable at 2.46. Interest payments 
on the other hand -have risen from  19% of operating costs in  1990 to  32% in  1995, the highest 
level  in  the Community.  The present contract between RENFE and the State provides for the  . 
latter to repay some debt and to  cover part of interest payments. It remains to be seen how far . 
this will improve RENFE's financial situation. 
28.In  Sweden,  substantial  investment  in  rolling  stock  and  in  infrastructure  has  led  to  a  large 
increase in SJ!BV's assets and debts in the 1980 and  1990's. The debt; equity ratio rose from the 
low level of 0.49 in  1980 to  1.56 in  1990,  followed by a very large rise. to 3.35  in  1995.  Debt 
service also  increased several times over, but only reached 7% of operating costs in  1995.  The 
State has  recently changed the financial  arrangements of both organisations,  so  their situation 
will  need to be reassessed at a later stage.  Finally,  in  France the SNCF  invested heavily in the 
1980's  and  1990's,  largely  to  build  the  high-speed  network.  Much  of this  investment  was 
financed.by debt (and unfunded operating deficits between  1992 and_  1995  added to debt).  The 
SNCF's  de~t increased by  30% between 1990 and  1995,  after growing by 65% between  1980 
and  1990.  A restructuring in  1991  reduced  debt by  21%,  but it then  rapidly  increased and  in  -
1995  was 29% above the 1990 level.  Because of equity injections the debt : equity ratio in fact 
fell from 4.82 in  1990 to 3 .46, but this is still a very  h~gh  -Ievel  and to be compared with 1.22 in 
1980.  Debt service remained  at  around  13%  of operaing costs,  in  1995  as  in  1990.  In  1996, however, the State restructured the tinances of the SNCF, transfering 70% of debt to the Reseau 
Ferre de France. 
An assessment 
29.The financial  situation of five  railways,  CH  (Greece),  CP  (Portugal),  RENFE (Spain),  SJ/BV 
(Sweden) and SNCF (France) was serious in 1  995; since then,  States have acted to  relieve debt 
and improve finances, but it is too soon to judge whether debt has been reduced to a manageable 
level.  CP (Portugal)  remains  in  grave financial  difficulty.  Taking the  Community as  a  whole 
however, the debt situation has improved, and the debt : equity ratio declined to around unity in 
1995. Debt service remains a serious burden on finances for enterprises that lose money or are 
marginally viable. 
30.This  leads  to  the  question  of whether  present  levels  of debt  represent  "sound  financial 
management", the term of Directive 91/440/EEC. It is  possible to give some indications but not 
a definite answer.  First,  the figures  for railway debt have to  be seen  in  the context of normal 
commercial practice. It  is  usual for enterprises, whether privately or publicly owned, to take on 
debt to finance· investment (fixed assets  and working capital), because under certain conditions 
this is  more advantageous than raising equity.  Asset intensive companies typically bear a higher 
level of debt than companies  wit~ less assets, because the assets can be used as  security. While 
comparisons are of I  im ited value,  it is  nevertheless interesting that in  1997 the North American 
railways  had  a  debt  : equity  ratio  of 0.72,  lower  than  the  Community average  in  1995  but 
similar to that of a number of European railways. 
3l.The second consideration is whether an  investment produces an adequate return and whether the 
investing  company  can  afford  to  service  the  debt.  Many  railways  have  not been  subject to 
normal commercial disciplines as  regards investment,  at any  rate not until  recently,  and  much 
investment since 1  980 is  considered to  give a low or negative return.  Moreover five  railways 
faced in  1995 interest payments above 10% of operating costs : CH (Greece), CP (Portugal), FS 
(Italy, RENFE (Spain) and SNCF (France).  For three, debt service had reached around· 30% of 
operating costs (CP, FS and RENFE), clearly not a sustainable situation. 
32.0verall, the debt position of the Community's railways  improved considerably between  1980 
and 1995. Further improvements are to be expected when later figures become available. Overall 
only the position of CP  (Portugal) still  appears critical.  This does  not  mean~ however, that the 
financial situation of the railways can be taken  as  totally sound.  Debt service remains a heavy 
burden  for  some  because  of large  scale  investments  in  the  years  before.  In  addition  there 
continues  to  be a  serious  problem. of op·erating  deficits,  mainly  caused  by stagnant revenue, 
inadequate  gains  in  productivity  and  hence  excessive  costs,  and  possibly  insufficient 
compensation  for  public services  rendered.  At  the  policy  level,  the  Community  has  not yet 
·created a framework for railway finances that clearly defines the reponsibilities of the State and 
of the railways. Many aspects remain obscure, including the real use to  which public support is 
put.  Once the Community has established a full  set of rules for financial  relations between the 
State and the railway, it should become clearer whether railway finances are on a sound footing. V. ACCESS RIGHTS . 
33.The  Directive  established  access. rights  for  groupings  of  railway  undertakings· to  operate 
international  .services  between  the  Member  States  where  the  constituent  enterprises  are 
established  ~nd for railways undertakings to  operate  international  combined transport  s~rvices 
I  throughout the Community. All  Member States have transposed these rights with the exception . 
.  of Italy  and  Luxembourg  (as  of 1st  March  1998),  arid  the  Commission  is  taking  infraction 
. proceedings against them under Article 169 of the Treaty. In  1995 the Community ad_opted two 
complementary Directives intended to iay down the conditions of access, one on the licensing of 
. railway undertakings 
6  and the other on the allocation of infrastructure cap~city and the charging 
of infrastructure fees 
7 
.  These should  have been  transposed  by  27th -June  1997  but as  of 1st 
March  1998  only  four  Member  States  have  notified  transposal  and  the  Commission  is . 
conducting  infraction  proceedings . against  the  others.  This  means  that  even  the  limited 
framework provided by these two directives is  not yet in place; and there is wide agreement that 
it does not adequately define conditions of access. 
34.So far, only .two groupings offer services under the access rights of Directive 91/440/EEC, while 
another plans to  do so in  the  immediat~ future,  according to  th'e  information available to  the 
Commission.  Of course,  in  recent  years  the  national  railways  have  developed  cooperative 
ventures  to  launch  new  international  services  and  various  freight  ventures  include  transport 
und~rta)<.irigs other than the national railways. In  several Member States, new entrants havewon 
.the right to operate regional or local services. However these developments are not based on the 
access rights of the Directive; indeed domestic serVices-are completely outside the scope of this 
part  of_ the  Directive.  This  means  that  so  far. the  national  railways  face ·almost  no  real -
competition and can behave like monopolies. This is particularly serious in the freight marke~, as 
there is an urgent need for rail services that can compete with road transport and win back some 
of the market share that has  been  lost.  One  consequence of the lack of _new  entrants  is  weak 
pressure  to  charge  prices  that  are  as  competitive  as  possible;  experience  has  shown  that 
competition with other transport modes has not forced the railways to offer the lowest prices and 
the best quality service of which they are capable. This lack of incentive is. well illustrated by a 
recent example of an international service run by two railways. One, seeking to make the service 
more attnictive,  reduced  its  price ·unilaterally by  30%~ Instead of responding positively. to this 
·attempt to·· widen the market, the other increased its  price by 60%. If access to the market wete 
effectively open, it would not ha:ve been able to behave in this manner. 
35.Why have so  fe~ railway undertakings used the access rights. of Directive 911440/EEC;  indeed 
why are there so few  new entrants  in  general?  Here it is  important to distinguish between the 
·economics of railway operation and barriers to the market of a regulatory nature.' A new entrant 
to the railway sector faces high start-up costs, having to buy or lease traction and rolling stock, 
find  experienced· management and  qualified  train  crews  and  maintenance  personnei,' conduct 
negotiation~ with infrastructure managers and obtain the different authorisations needed. All this 
· is to enter a market where competition is fierce, from other often dominant railway undertakings 
and  other modes of transport.  It is  therefore  natural  that  there  has  not been  a  flood  of new 
ent1~ants: The· national  railways do  not face  these obstacles, but clearly prefer to  cooperate with 
·their counterparts  m  other  Member  States  rather  than  to  compete  with.them  on  what they 
6 Council Directive 95/ISEC of 19 June 1995 on the licensing of railway undertakings. O.J. L 143, 22/6/95. 
7 Council Directive 95/19/EC of 19 June 1995 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the charging of 
·infrastructure fees: OJ. Ll43. 22/6/95  -consider their territory; indeed they see such cooperation as the way to improve international rail 
transport. 
36.As for  conditions of access,  there  is  a  wide  agreement  that  the  framework  is  not  complete 
(leaving aside the question of late implementation of existing directives). It should set the main 
conditions  for  access  to  infrastructure,  for  charging  and  capacity  allocation  in  particular.  It 
should guarantee that all  railway undertakings are treated fairly and without discrimination and 
prevent  possible  abuse  of dominant  position  by  the  integrated  railways,  that  both  supply 
transport services and  manage infrastructure,  in  conformity with the Community's competition 
rules.  It should  also  respond  to  a  perception  by  potential  new  entrants  that  the  integrated 
railways  do  not and  will  not  treat them  fairly,  when  it  comes  to  allocating  capacity,  setting 
charges and, in some cases, regulating safety. 
37.ln  fact  the  integrated  railways  face  a  conflict  of interest.  On  the  one  hand,  through  the 
management of infrastructure, they determine the conditions under which potential competitors 
enter the market and  conduct their business.  ln  exercising this responsibility, they should treat 
equitably and without discrimination all  transport services, that is  their own and those operated 
by  their  competitiors.  On  the  other,  every  part  of  an  integrated  railway,  including  its 
infrastructure  manager,  is  naturally  supposed  to  advance  the  interests  of the  enterprise  as  a 
whole.  It therefore  has  an  incentive  to  favour  its  own  transport  operations  over those  of a 
competitor, in  the ways mentioned. The study on the implementation of Directive 91/440/EEC 
found that fear of unfair treatment was widespread and a major reason for not considering entry 
tothe market.  · 
38.Directive 95/19/EC  lays  down  general  principles  for  infrastructure  charges  but these  are  too 
loose to be an  adequate basis for setting charges.  Indeed there remain fundamental differences 
between national  approaches to  charging and  no  consensus yet on  how charges should reflect 
costs or take account of intermodal competition. Also the lack of precise Community rules has 
made  it  difficult for some Member States  to  develop  charging systems.  So  far,  only Austria, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Netherlandsl<  , .Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom  have 
explicit charging systems.  While the creation of a,  charging system  is  certainly a step forward, 
wide differen<;:es  remain between the national  systems and these usually do  not take sufficient 
account  of competition  from  other  modes  of transport.  Moreover  in  certain  Member  States 
charges are structured in such a way as to disadvantage small operators, and new entrants tend to 
operate on a small scale . For example, Austria and France apply two part tariffs with high fixed 
charges, which may reflect their costs of infrastructure management but not the economics of 
transporting  relatively  small  quantities  by  rail;  in  Germany  discounts  are  given  for  train  -
kilometres  operated  and  duration  of the  order.  Such  practices  favour  incumbent  railway 
undertakings and deter new entrants, and lead to lower quantities being carried by rail. There is . 
also the question of whether they are compatib \e with the Community's competition rules. 
39.The way train paths are  allocated  is  also  crucial  to  a  new  entrant.  The process  needs  to  be 
transparent and fair to all  railway undertakings, to  respond rapidly to  demand and to make best 
use of capacity;  th~re have to  be clear procedures for resolving problems of scarce capacity. In 
addition it should be implemented by an organisation independent of dominant suppliers of rail 
transport  services,  as  there  is  ·a  conflict  of interest  and  risk  of unfair  treatment  if capacity 
allocation is  done by an  infrastructure manager that also operates transport services. At present 
there is  an  independent allocation body only in  Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
K The Netherlands has set a zero charge until 2000. except for the Freeways. 
11 Kingdom,  although.  apparently  other' Member  States  are  pla1ining. to  establish  them.  In  ~two 
·.·Member  States,  according to  the .information  available,  capacity  is  reserved  for  the  national 
'railway,  althougli.Directive.91/440/EECdoes not  I;Q1it  access  right_s  in.  such  a  way.  Another 
distinct issue is  whether the  right to-book  and  purchase train  paths should remain  rt?Served  to 
railway undertakings,-that is undertakings ~hat ensure traction, or extended to other undertakings. 
·There is  no obvious reason to  restrict this  right,  particularly as  other operators inay carry some . 
. of the financial  risk for the provision of  a service.  It must be emphasised that this is  different 
. from  the  right of access· to  railway  infrastructure,  that  is  the  right to  provide  rail  transport 
services. Because of the expertise needed to  operate trains. efficiently and with a. high degree of 
safety, this  must continue to  be reserved  to  rai I  way  undertakings.  The Co~mission intends. to 
. propose guidelines on infrastructure charges and on capacity allocation in the immediate future. 
- .  .  .  . 
40.The right regulatory arrangements contribute to fair compe_tition in other ways. For example, to 
prevent safety certification becoming a barrier to entry, there is a need f9r clear rules, whether at 
national  or Community  level,  and  for  independent bodies  to· certify  conformity.  Inforination 
about .the. characteristics of infrastructure should be· equally available to all  operators and  not 
withheld on the grounds of commercial sensitivity.  Procedures for licensing should l;>e  wholly. -
.  . 
independent of all  undertakings  supplying  rail  transport  services.  Facilities  essential  for  the. 
operation  of ·transport  services  should  be  made  available. without"  discrimination 'to  railway 
undertakings.  Some facilities,  that  are  not  infrastructure,  are  at  present only -p-rovided  by  the· 
(ncumbent  railways,  because of the  monopoly  they· have·  had  for  a  long  period of time,  for 
example freight terminals, stabling facilities,  maintenance workshops and training schools. The 
national railways clearly dominate the supply of theseservices, but this shouid not be a barrier to 
entry. These are is·sues that the Commission will consider at a later stage. 
41.Finally the access- rights of Directive  91/4~0/EEC are  limited  and  conditional which reduces 
. their attraction and helps explain their small  effect on the groun_d.  Under the Directive; except 
when offering international· combined  transpor:t  services, ·a railway undertaking established in 
one Member State has to find  a partner established in· the Member State to which it intends 'to 
operate services, and form an  international grouping with it.  Iri  practice the only possible partner 
may be the national railway.This may consider it against  ~ts interest .to  compete against another 
national railway through an  international grouping, because. it  could lead to competition on its 
own. home market and because it  would go  against a long tradition of  cooperation with other 
railways. Consequently the condition of forming on international grouping is likely to deter new 
entrants and i's  perceived as a serious obstacle to entering the market.  . 
42. The Directive creates, access  rights  for operating international  not for domestic services.  This 
distinction-ignores the realities of the market, particularly for wagon load freight, which matters 
. enormously, as the' majority of international rail freight is Rauled  in  wagon load quantities·. Very 
often  <l  wagon  is  moved  within  a  Member  State,  for  instance  from  the  loading  point to  a 
marshalling  yard,  before  being joined to  an. international  train;  or  it  may  make a  'dom~stic 
movement after the international journey, or both.  It follows that a railway undertaking, wh(:n 
exploiting thc:a.ccess rights ofthe Directive, must rely on the incumbent railway for the domestic 
-legs  oL  the operation.  It  cannot  provide  a  point  to  point service,  as  the  incumbent can,  nor 
compete on service qualitity and P,rice over the.\\;'hole route.  Consequently, the limitation of the 
access rights to international services artificially divides and  distorts the market and deter's new 
operators from competing.  ' 43.The current arrangements may also  hamper the  development of cross border traffic,  for which 
there is  a large potential as  many centres of population and of economic activity lie within, say, 
100 kilometres from  a frontier.  When traffic originates close to  the border of a Member State, 
the first part of the journey is  carried out by a railway undertaking established in that State. On 
arrival at the border, the train would then be handed over to a railway undertaking established in 
the second Member State.  However,  because the distance to  the  frontier  in  the first Member 
State is short, the charge for the haul on that leg would be disproportionately high, as  in general 
the charge per kilometre falls  as  the length of the trip  increases.  The high charge for the first 
stage to the border tends to discourage railway undertakings from offering cross border services 
or leads them  to  charge a high price, so  restricting demand.  The present set up may. distort the 
supply of transport services  in  other ways.  For instance,  it  is  in  the  interest of each  railway 
undertaking to ensure that it moves as  much  traffic as  possible  i'tself,  in  order to  receive the 
largest proportion of overall revenues. The requirement to form an  international grouping means 
there is  little an  individual  railway undertaking can  do  to  influence such decisions and offer a 
more direct service at  lower cost.  There are numerous  cases of traffic being carried by  road, 
when there is  potential for a competitive rail service,  because one operator was not allowed to 
supply the whole service from origin to destination or, more generally to design the best product 
for the market. 
VI.EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS 
44.The newly signed Treaty, in its Employment Title, states that  ''a high level of  employment shall 
b~ taken into consideration in the formulation and implementation of  Community policies and 
activities." (Article 127 § 2)  The Amsterdam European Council decided to make the provisions 
relating  to  the  Employment Title  immediately  effective  and  the  Extraordinary  Luxembourg 
European  Council  agreed  upon  an  .overall  strategy  which  includes  "the  harnessing  of all 
Community  policies  in  support  of  employment  in  accordance  with  the  Treaty."  The 
Commission,  in  its  Communication  on  Growth  and  Employment  in  the  Stability-Orientated 
Framework of EMU,  has  subsequently dealt extensively with  the employment challenge,  thus 
effectively  mainstreaming  employment  in  its  treatment  of macroeconomic  issues.  Policies 
relating to the functioning of the single market, sectoral policies and labour market reforms are 
to incorporate the same employment concerns.  · 
45.Employment in European railways has been declining continuously since 1980 when it stood at . 
1.668.000. The work force fell  by 21% (to  1.320.000) between  1980 and 1990 with almost all  / 
Member States experiencing declines during this period, ~nd with the U.K. and Sweden showing 
the largest drops (-44% each), followed by Ireland (-35%), Belgium (-31%), Spain (-30%), and 
Finland  (-30%).  The decline  intensified  from  1990  to  .1996  with  an  overall  fall  of 31% (to 
arol:lnd 907.000). The heaviest falls were in Germany (-47%), Portugal (  -41 %), Italy (-38%), the 
U.K.  (-30%),  Finland  (-26%),  Spain  (-25%)  and Denmark  (-24%);  employment  in  Sweden 
recorded an increase over the period (+6%). 
46.Railway undertakings  and  railway  trade  unions  are  concerned  about the  effects of  Directive 
91/440/EEC on  employment on  the  railways.  This  is  easy  to  understand  as  employment has 
already dropped heavily,  from  1.668.000  in  1980 to  around 967.000  in  1995,  and 907.000  in 
1996. It is  sometimes argued that the Directive has  caused employment to drop in two ways: by 
req1.:1iring  management of railways  on  commercial lines  and  by  creating  competition  for  the 
established operators from new entrants that require less staff to do the same job. 
rf" 47.The reasons for the aecline in  railway employment would however seem to  lie in  a multitude of 
factors:  rises  in  productivity as  ~ew techniques were being deployed,  stagnant demand for rail 
transport as competition from other modes grew stronger, and pressure on public funds available 
to  compensate  for  public  services,  meet  operating  losses  and  maintain  higher·  levels  of 
employment than needed for efficient operation-within the new overall competitive environment. 
It is necessary to distinguish these factors contributing to the decline in employment from effects 
directly linked to Directive 91/440/EEC. 
48.Probably the  best.  way  to  assess  the  impact of Directive. 911440/EEC  is  to  see  whether the 
decline  in  employment began  before  its  implementation,  or whether  it  accelerated when the 
Directive was put into effect.  In other words, was there a break in trends when the Directive w~s 
introduced? The answer would give some indication of the impact of the Directive but would not · 
be definitive, because it is  necessary to assume that other factors do not change greatly. Table 4 
gives changes in  employment in  the fifteen  national  railways of the Community over different 
periods  of time.  ·It  shows  both  the  average  annual  decrease  m  employment  (the  absolute 
numb.ers) and the percentage ·change over each period of time. 
49.The table makes it clear that employment was already falling heavily in the 1980's, long before 
the adoption of the Directive.  Decline accelerated in  the earLy  1990's as the cut in employment 
in  Deutsche  Reichsbahn  began;  excluding  DR,  the  quantity of job losses  was  similar in  the 
1980's and  in  the early  1990's. However, to  trace the impact of the Directive more precisely, 
trends should be compared before and after the implementation of the Directive. It should have 
been transposed by  1993, but  most Member States were late.  However a number had done so by 
1994,  so this  is  an  appropriate date to  take;  still  it  gives  a very  short time series and various 
Member  St~tes had  not  yet  implemented the  Directive by that date.  The table shows a steeper 
decline ih  employment after  1994;  the higher numbers  leaving the industry between  1994 ap.d 
1996,  compared ·with  those  in  the  preceding  three  years,. are  largely  accounted  for  by  the 
reduction in DBAG's employment following the merger of DB and DR..  Leaving aside DBAG, 
employment fell  by  32.000  per  annum  between  1990. and  1994  and  by  34.000  per  annu'in 
between 1994 and  1996, compared to 31.000 in the late 1980's. Job reductions were particularly 
serious in FS and in BR prior to privatisation.  · 
50.As CO$t  and debt pressures are nevertheless expected to continue to force rationalisation within 
the industry for some years to come, it is essential to assess the  employment effects according to 
the. different situations  in  the different Member States.  Equally,  it is 'important for the change 
·towards  running  the  EU  railways  on  a  more  commercial  basis· to  be  assessed,  as  far  as 
employment is concerned,  not only in  quantitative  but also  in·  qualitative terrns  Gob  profiles, 
educational levels etc.). 
5Llf it  is  too  early  and  complex  to  identify  an  employment impact 'directly  attributable  to  the 
.Directive 91/440/EEC, it  is  accepted that the long term  employment prospects in  the sector will 
ultimately depend on its  modernisation and  its  competitive position.  The know-how, skills .and 
·adaptability of its  workforce can  greatly  contribute to  a market orientation of the sector.  The 
Commission will  in  this respect continue to  encourage discussion of appropriate policy measures 
to improve the  adaptability and  employability of workers  affected by the secular employment 
decline whether caused by long term productivity trends or by specific factors such as changes in 
·ownership and management structure. By the same token the Commission will continue to invite 
/6 reflection on staff training needs and  human resource investment requirements arising from the 
structural changes in  the sector. 
52.ln conclusion, it seems that the decline in  employnient began long before the implementation of 
Directive 91/440/EEC, which so far  has had no  clear effect on long term  trends.  It is  possible, 
however, that in  future the Directive will  have an  impact, particularly if new entrants began to 
exploit access rights on a significant scale. To  make a fair assessment, it would be necessary to 
balance the reduction in  employment in  the incumbent railways caused by competition against 
the  employment  created  by  the  arrival  of new  entrants  and  the  expansion  of the  market  if 
competitiveness improves. At this stage it is  worth repeating a point made in the Commission's 
white paper "A strategy for revitalising the Community's railways" :  ..... "only a dramatic rise in 
performance will guarantee the long-term future of rail  transport and employment. The aim of 
Community policy, as  explained in  this white paper, is  to bring about such a change. Failure to 
act will  inevitably cause further deterioration  in  the position of the railways on the transport 
market,  and  could jeopardise  their  presence  in  major  segments.  Vigorous  action  to  restore 
competitiveness is the only way to stable employment". 
VII.POLICY CONCLUSIONS 
Debt reduction and financial improvement 
53.The railways'  debt  situation  has  improved  substantially since  1990,  as  Member  States  have 
reduced  debt  and  restructured  finances,  but  this  does  not  mean  that  the  situation  is  yet 
satisfactory. The Commission intends closely to  fol~o\V trends and to  report again in three years 
time  on  the  debt  situation  of the  railways.  More  generally,  the  Community  needs  a  clear 
framework for railway finances.  Later this  year the Commission intends to  revise the rules on 
public services and on State aid for land  transport,  and so  provide a solid basis for structuring 
railway finances. 
Infrastructure : framework conditions 
54. The communication shows that Directive 91/440/EEC does not ensure the degree of separation 
needed  in  order  to  achieve  efficient  managernent  of the  two  activites,  provide  a  basis  for 
infrastructure charges and  ensure transparency about flows of public money.  The Commission 
therefore plans to  propose the modification of Directive 91/440/EEC to  require the separation 
both of profit and  Joss  accounts and of balance sheets between infrastructure management and 
transport services. 
SS.The Community has  not fully  defined the conditions of access to  the market.  There is  a wide 
consensus, that includes railway undertakings, that the Community must establish more precise 
rules on charges and on capacity allocation, in  order to  ensure efficient use of infrastructure and 
fair treatment of all  railway undertakings. The Commission intends to present in the near future 
a package of measures concerning the utilisation of infrastructure. This would include guidelines 
on infrastructure charges and guidelines on the allocation of infrastructure capacity. 
56.There is  a  risk  that  new entrants will  not  receive fair  treatment from  infrastructure managers, 
when these are a part of an  integrated railway undertaking that also operates transport services. 
Infrastructure managers will have an incentive to advance the interests of the whole undertaking 
incl.llding its transport service division.  This could lead  them to favouring their own operations 
over those of competitors. when  it  comes to  setting charges, allocating train paths, or licensing 
rr and  certifying  safety  when  this  is  their  responsibility.  The  Commission  intends  to  propose 
measures to remove such conflicts of interest  in  its  infrastructure package.  Safety certification 
could  be  a  barrier  to  entry,  if clear  rules  are  not  set  and  if conformity  is  not  certified  by 
independent  bodies.  At a  later  stage  the  Commission  will  consider  this  and  other  potential 
obstacles to entering the market. 
Access to infrastructure : wider rights 
57.The Commission  believes  that  extending the  access  rights  created  by  Directive  91/440/EEC 
would  valuably  build  on  the  progress  already  achieved.  The  communication  suggests  that 
advancing beyond the access rights created by Directive 91/440/EEC, and in particular removing 
the  requirement  to form  an  international  grouping,  would  enormously  enhance  the  rights' 
effectiveness.  It is  vital  to· continue  opening  access  to  railway  infrastructure,  especially  for 
freight transport which has  been losing market share for decades.  Opening access would allow 
new enterprises to  enter the market offering new and better services;  although their operations 
would  remain  marginal  in  scale for  a  long "time  because of high  start-up costs,  new entrants 
would identify fresh business opportunities and stimulate the incumbents to perform better. 
58.In 1995  the Commission proposed opening access for the operation of international passenger 
services and for all freight transport, domestic and international
9 
. While there was wide support 
for liberalisation, particularly from  the users of rail  transport,  the Commission's proposal was 
criticised on two grounds : for introducing liberalisation immediately not progressively and for 
lacking the accompanying measures  needed  to  define the conditions of access.  The European 
Parliament took this view in  its resolution
10
_  on the white paper "A strategy for revitalising the 
Community's railways" : 
"E.  whereas  rail  liberalisation  should,  as  with  maritime  and  air  transport  and 
telecommunications,  proceed  in  stages  in  conjunction with the  parallel  implementation of the 
necessary accompanying measures, although this .should not mean that the ultimate objective of 
extending free market rules  to  rail  freight  and  the international transport of passengers by rail 
should be unnesessarily slowed down". 
4 .... "takes the view that liberalisaion should be progressive, beginning with the liberalisation of 
international  freight  transport  arid  followed  by  domestic  freight  tranport  and  international 
passenger transport". 
"7. Takes the view that the Commission should submit proposals in order, firstly, to give railway 
undertakings the right of free access to  railway infrastructure on the basis of an amendment to 
Articlt:t.  1  0(2) of the Directive 91/440/EEC for  the operation of international freight transport 
and,  secondly,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  simultaneous  elaboration  and  implementation  of  .  , 
accompanymg measures: .........  . 
9 Communication from the Conunissio~1 on the development of the Community's railways, COM(95)337 final 
19.7.95. 
10 Resolution on the Commission's wl~ite paper "A strategy for revitalising the community's railways" and the 
Commission communication on the trans-European freeways.  A4-0412/97, 13.1.98. 
I~ 59.The Commission recognises the need to phase market opening, beginning with the freight sector, 
and  accepts  that  there  is  a  strong  case  for  progressivity,  in  the  spirit  of the  Commission's 
. Communication on services of general interest in  Europe
11 
.  This would give incumbent railway 
undertakings time to adjust to an open market, after a long period of monopoly, and provide the 
stability  needed for  the long term investments usual  in  the railway sector.  Moreover it would 
reflect the economics of rail  transport : because of high start-up costs and economies of scale, 
existing operators will most probably continue to dominate the freight market for the foreseeable 
future.  This is  what is  happening in  the more open  markets.  Competitors to the incumbent in 
recently liberalised railway markets such as  Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom have significantly less than 5% of the freight market. These markets have also recently 
seen  significant expansion  in  total  rail  freight operations.  This  suggests  that market opening 
tends  to  expand  the  market  rather  than  to  take  business  away  from  the  incumbents.  The 
Commission  also  accepts  the  second  point  emphasised by  the Parliament,  the  importance of 
accompanying measures, and believes that the proposals it  intends to  make in  1998 will fill  the 
main gaps in the framework. 
60.A possible approach would be to  open the freight market,  without distinguishing between the 
domestic and international sectors because domestic operations often feed  international services 
and every link in the chain must be strengthened, but to do so partially and by stages. This might 
be achieved by  at  least opening,  5%  of the  freight  market immediately,  progressing by  equal 
steps to  15% after five years and then continuing to  r.each  25% after ten  years;  and at the half 
way point there could be a review mechanism to  check that the levels were still appropriate.  In 
more precise terms, the Community would progressively extend the rights of access to  railway 
infrastructure  for  the  operation  of freight  services  by  railway  undertakings  other  than  the 
incumbent operator  in  each  Member State,  so  that an  increasing  proportion of infrastructure 
capacity is made available to these undertakings. 
6l.One way of implementing this would be to  measure capacity by the freight train kilometres run 
in each Member State during. the preceeding year. Capacity would be allocated between different 
railway  undertakings  on  a  fair  and  non-discriminatory  basis,  following  the  principles  and 
processes laid down by the Directive 95119 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity 
and the charging of infrastructure fees, and following the guidelines that the Commission intends 
to  propose. Capacity not claimed by a new entrant would be offered to  the incumbent operator 
for the timetabling period in question. Such an approach would stimulate a rapid improvement in 
performance, while avoiding disruption of the market and allowing experience to be gained. The 
Commission intends to consult widely on this idea before deciding on a proposal. 
II COM (96)443, 11.9.96. 
,, Table I 
RAILWAY DEBT 1980 TO 1990 
3 
CFL (Luxembourg)  0.92  0.91  3  4 
CH (Greece)  0.19  0.58  3  9 
CIE (Ireland)  1.91  2.14  3·  7 
CP (Portugal)  2.12  2.28  30  16 
DB (Germany)  1.58  1.90  8  10 
DSB (Denmark)  0.12  0.15  2  2 
FS (Italy)  3.31  1.10  ll  21 
NS (Netherlands)  0.77  0.58  .2  8 
(Austria)  0.15  0.14  2  2 
RENFE (Spain)  1.14  2.26  7  19 
SJ/BV (Sweden)  0.49  1.56  1.  3 
SNCB (Bel~ium)  1.39  0.67  5  8 
Source: Mercer Management Consulting. 
1 Ratio of debt (long and short tcnn) to equity; equity =I. 
2  .  . 
Interest payments as percentage of operating costs. Table 2 
RAILWAY DEBT 1990 TO 1995 
BR (Great Britain)  0.93  2.52  3  3 
CFL (Luxembourg)  0.91  0.76  4  8 
CH (Greece)  0.58  0.93  9  15 
CIE (Ireland)  2.14  1.72  7  3 
CP (Portugal)  2.28  12.86  16  30 
DB (Germany)  1.90  0.54  10  1 
DSB (Denmark)  0.15  0.06  2  0 
FS (Italy)  1.10  0.69  21  29 
NS (Netherlands)  0.58  0.42  8  1 
(Austria)  0.14  0.51  2  4 
RENFE (Spain)  2.26  2.46  19  32 
SJIBV (Sweden)  1.56  3.35  3  7 
SNCB (Belgium)  0.67  1.00  8  6 
SNCF (France)  4.82  3.46  13  13 
VR (Finland)  0.15  0.26  0  2 
Source: Mercer Management Consulting. 
1 Ratio of debt (long and short term) to equity; equity = l. 
2  • 
Interest payments as percentage of operating costs. Table 3 
RAILWAY DEBT EVOLUTION 1980 TO 1995 
BR (Great Britain)  -14  121 
CFL (Luxembourg)  12  25 
CH (Greece)  149  125  .. 
CIE (Ireland)  104  9 
CP (Por_tugal)  -24  129 
DB (Germany)  12  -72 
DSB (Denmark)  -31  -52 
FS (Italy)  -16 
NS (Netherlands)  16  -35 
(Austria)  20  152 
RENFE (Spain)  52  27 
SJ/BV (Sweden)  297  41 
SNCB (Belgium)  -14  39 
SNCF (France)  10  37 
VR (Finland)  .  485  91 





overr  od 
Table 4 
EMPLOYMENT CHANGE 1980-1996 
31  41  70  69 
-9  -13  -21  -13 
N.B. Including former Deutsche Reichsbahn. 
All Member  1.450 
States 
plus 
Deutsche  1.688 
Reichsbahn 
EMPLOYMENT LEVELS 1980-1994 
(thousands) 
1.284  1.082  985  1.034 
1.531  1.320  1.123 
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer; Mercer Management Consulting. 
34 
-10 
967  907 
2..3 Table 4a 
EMPLOYMENT BY  RAILWAY 1980- 1996 
CFL Luxembourg)  4.2  3.5  3.2  - 17  -9 
CH (Greece)  12.1  13.3  11.7  +9  - 12 
CIE (Ireland)  18.1  ll.8  11.0  -35  -7 
CP (Portugal)  24.7  22.1  13.0  -10  - 41 
DB (Germany  566.9  482.3  256.7  - 15  ..:  47 
DSB (Denmark)  22.1  20.4  15.6  -8  -24 
FS (Italy)  220.7  200.4  123.4  -9  -38 
NS (Netherlands)  26.9  26.2  24.0  -3  -8 
(Austria)  72.5.  66.9  57~0  -8  - 15 
RENFE (Spain)  71.5  49.7  37.4  -30  -25 
SJIBV (Sweden)  37.5  20.8  22.0  -44  - + 6 
SNCB (Belgium)  66.7  45.2  41.4  -31  -9 
SNCF (Franc,e)  254.4  202.1  177.9  -21  - 12 
VR (Finland)  28.7  20.2  14.9  -30  -26 
Sources: Union lnternationale des Chemins de:Fer, Eurostat 
1  U.K. Govenuncnt estimate 
2  Including Deutsche Reichsbalm Table 5 
BASIC INDICATORS 1980-1995 
1980  1985  1990  1995 
Passenger-
kilometres  237  238  253  263 
Tonne-
kilometres  232  220  215  222 
469  457  468  484 
1980  .  1985  1990  1995 
Traffic units 
per employee  323  356  432  4?8 
Operating costs/ 
t 000 traffic  160  155  137  134 
















Table 5 (continued) 
INCOME STATEMENT 





·Source: Mercer Management Consulting. 
· 
1 Infrnstructure support excluding capital injections. 
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